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STERLING v. REECHER
DOUBLE LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS-
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Sterling v. Reecher1
Appellant, receiver of the Central Trust Company, pur-
suant to an order obtained in October, 1932, out of the
Circuit Court of Frederick County, brought this action in
the Circuit Court of Washington County in September,
1938, to recover an amount equal to the full par value of
stock held by the appellee, as provided for in the Code.2
The appellee pleaded that the cause of action did not ac-
crue within three years before the institution of the suit,
the period of limitations under the Code for actions of
assumpsit and debt on simple contract.3 The receiver de-
murred to this plea of limitations, contending that the suit
was upon a statute and that the period of limitations for
specialties was twelve years.4 This demurrer was over-
ruled and error was assigned on appeal.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower court,
held that as the action was one on a specialty, the period
of limitations was twelve years and that appellant's de-
murrer should have been sustained. After holding that
the liability of the appellee was wholly statutory, the
Court pointed out that the question was one of the rem-
edy rather than of the origin or nature of the liability,
saying:
"It has been held generally that when the statute
creating a liability provides the remedy and allows no
other, then the remedy could be only that provided,
and it would be grounded on the statute, necessarily,
but that a common law action of debt might lie either
when such an action is given by the statute or when
the statute provides for the payment of a sum of money
but does not mention any mode of recovering it."
*6A. (2d) 237 (Md. 1939).
* Md. Code (1924) Art. 11, Sec. 72
Md. Code (1924) Art. 57, See. 1: "All actions of account, actions of
assumpslt, or on the case, actions of debt on simple contract, detinue or
replevin . . . [must be brought] . . . within three years from the time the
cause of action accrued . .."
' Md. Code (1924) Art. 57, Sec. 3: "No bill, testamentary, administra-
tion or other bond (except sheriffs and constable's bonds), Judgment,
recognizance, statute merchant, or of the staple or other specialty whatso-
ever, . . . shall be good and pleadable, or admitted in evidence . . . after
. . twelve years standing; . . ."
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The Court reasoned further that the element of con-
tract in a subscription of stock, upon which the statute of
Maryland lays the double liability, has produced uncer-
tainty, raising the question of whether the liability was
grounded on the contract or on the statute. What the stat-
ute provided was a question of the intention to be ascer-
tained from express terms, or by implication. If the stat-
ute5 merely intended that a new plaintiff should be sub-
stituted for the individual creditors on an old action, then
it might be argued that a common law action had been
continued and it might be a misinterpretation of the stat-
ute to say that it had provided an exclusive remedy so
that the suit had to be one on the statute.
However, the Court went on to say that the statute6
provided for an exclusive remedy, and the old one had
ceased to exist. Citing Ghingher v. Bachtell,7 the opin-
ion pointed out that the Act of 1904, Chapter 101, took the
remedy from the hands of the creditors and placed it in
those of the receiver, the new law making the receiver,
representing the interests of the corporation as well as
all the creditors, the only proper party to initiate the pro-
ceedings against all the stockholders, at the same time,
for the enforcement of their statutory liability. By the
later Act of 1910, Chapter 219,8 the liability of stockhold-
ers in trust companies and banks was united; and, by this
coalescence, not only was the remedy for enforcement
against both still exclusively that in the hands of the re-
ceivers, but the liability itself was placed on a new foun-
dation. Previous to these statutes9 a legal fiction of con-
tract between stockholder and creditor was created to al-
low these suits by the individual creditors against the in-
dividual stockholders. This legal fiction was abandoned
under these subsequent statutes and, instead, a liability
directly owing to the bank or trust company was substi-
tuted. Stockholders at the date of the receivership were
subjected to this liability regardless of whether they had
been stockholders at the time the debt was incurred. Thus,
under these subsequent statutes, there was no doubt that
Md. Code (1924) Art. 11, Sec. 72.
6 Ibid.
7169 Md. 678, 182 A. 558 (1936), noted (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 95; and(1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 270. Affirmed in Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300
U. S. 175, 81 L. Ed. 586, 57 S. Ct. 386 (1937).
' Md. Code (1924) Art. 11, Sec. 72.




the remedy for the liability as well as the liability itself
was purely statutory.
While the term specialty was, in its inception, formerly
regarded as only applicable to bonds, deeds, or other in-
struments under seal, it later came to be used both in
England and America to include debts upon statute as
well as debts upon recognizances, judgments, and de-
crees.1" This has been so in Maryland since an early date.1
While the Court felt it unnecessary to determine
whether or not, prior to these subsequent statutes,12 an
action brought by a creditor directly against a stockholder
would have been one upon a specialty, authority may be
found for so holding. Prior to these subsequent statutes,
the only liabilities applicable to banks were those imposed
in Article 3, Section 39 of the Maryland Constitution of
1867,' which was the source of bank stockholders liabil-
ity, and the statutory provision of the Act of 1870, Chap-
ter 206.1' Thus, it would seem that this liability imposed
upon the stockholders was one arising directly from stat-
ute, regardless of whether the legal fiction of contract was
used. Without the statutes the shareholders could not have
been held liable to the creditors at all and the legal fic-
tion of contract used by the courts to enforce this liabil-
ity would have never come into existence. Hence the
liability was one on the statute and not one on an implied
contract.
15
10 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 260; Mattare v. Cunningham, 148 Md.
309, 129 A. 654 (1925).
11Richards v. Maryland Ins. Co., 8 Cranch (U. S.) 84, 3 L. Ed. 496
(1814); Watkins v. Harwood, et al., 2 G. & J. 307 (Md. 1830) ; Ward v.
Reeder, 2 H. & McH. 145 (Md. 1785) ; French v. O'Neale, 2 H. & McH. 401
(Md. 1790) ; Newcomer v. Keedy, 2 Md. 19 (1852).
Supra n. 9.
i "The General Assembly shall grant no charter for Banking purposes,
nor renew any Banking Corporation in existence, except upon the condition
that the Stockholders shall be liable to the amount of their respective
share or shares of stock .... for all Its debts and liabilities upon note,
bill or otherwise; . . ." See infra n. 28, concerning the recent change In
this provision.
14 "An Act to create State Banking Institutions . . . Section 11. And be
it enacted, That the continuance of the said several corporations shall be
on the condition that the stockholders and directors of each of said cor-
porations shall be liable to the amount of their respective shure Zf shares
of stock in such corporation, for all Its debts and liabilities upon note, bill
or otherwise, and upon this further condition, that this Act and every part
of it may be altered from time to time, or repealed, by the Legislature."
15 Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason 243 (1817). In this case, Mr. Justice Story
held that the statute of limitations of New Hampshire did not bar an
action of debt brought by a creditor against a stockholder of a bank under
the provision of its charter imposing a personal responsibility upon the
shareholders for notes of the bank. Mr. Justice Story pointed out that,
except for some special provision by statute, the shareholders could not be
1940]
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Even if it was thought that the action was one arising
out of the legal fiction of contract, there was authority
showing that the English courts held that the statute of
limitations was not applicable to such contracts raised by
implication of law16 and this view has been followed by
some of our American courts.17
So, even prior to these later statutes, a result similar
to that of the instant case might have been reached,"8 al-
though the opinion of the Court in the principal case
seemed to rest entirely on these later statutes as inter-
preted in Ghingher v. Bachtel119 and Robinson v. Hospel-
horn. 0 Aside from these cases there are only two earlier
Maryland cases that are relevant to the problems pre-
sented here.
In Mister v. Thomas,2 1 an action was instituted by the
receiver of the Farmers Trust, Banking and Deposit Co.
which had been incorporated by the Act of 1902, Chapter
191, providing that, once a shareholder had fully paid for
his shares of stock, he was not thereafter assessable nor
liable for or on account of any purpose whatsoever. A re-
ceiver was appointed in October, 1907 and the court
granted an order in March, 1910 directing the receiver
to proceed against the stockholders of the bank. Defend-
ant shareholder pleaded the three years limitation period.
On appeal, the Court held that the defendant was sub-
ject to the statutory liability regardless of the act of in-
corporation and pointed out that, at the time of the in-
corporation, Article 3, Section 39 of the Constitution of
made answerable for the acts or debts of the bank. Although the law
contemplated a privity between them it has also created an obligation and
debt lies since a duty on the stockholder is a determinable sum and the
law esteems this an obligation created by the highest kind of specialty. If
debt lies it is hard to see how assumpsit would and there is no pretext of
any express promise; and If a promise be implied, it must be because there
exists a legal liability, independent of any promise sufficient to sustain one.
"Hodsden v. Harridge, 2 Wm. Saund. 64, 85 Eng. Rep. 672 (1671).
17 Jordan v. Robinson, 3 Shipley 167 (Me. 1838) ; Lane v. Morris, 8 Ga.
468 (1850).
" The text statement assumes that the intention of the provisions of Art.
3, Sec. 39 of the Maryland Constitution of 1867, and of the Act of 1870,
Chapter 206, as construed by the courts, was not merely to give bank and
trust companies a qualified corporate capacity, which would reserve the
common law liability of the members for the debts as if they were unin-
corporated bodies. See Corning v. McCullough, 1 Comstock 47 (N. Y.
1847).
9169 Md. 678, 182 A. 558 (1936). Affirmed in Peoples Banking Co. v.
Sterling, 300 U'. S. 175, 81 L. Ed. 586, 57 S. Ct. 386 (1937).
"169 Md. 117, 179 A. 515, 103 A. L. R. 740 (1935), stating that the lia-
bility created by Md. Code (1924) Art. 11, See. 72 is wholly statutory.
"122 Md. 445, 89 A. 844 (1914).
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Maryland and the Act of 1892, Chapter 109,22 were in force;
that the Act of 1904, Chapter 101, effected both a change
as to the amount of the liability and the remedy for its
enforcement. As to the period of limitations, the Court
did not consider whether or not this was a specialty, but
merely stated that three years had not run since the ac-
tion accrued.
In the case of Mattare v. Cunningham the question
presented was whether the period of limitations on an
award made by the State Industrial Accident Commis-
sion was three or twelve years. The Court held that the
award was not a judgment, as the Commission was not
a court but an administrative body which acted in a quasi-
judicial capacity, but that the award was a specialty, and
was not barred by limitations if suit was brought thereon
within twelve years. In its opinion the Court stated that
statutory liabilities had been frequently termed special-
ties by the courts and that specialty by statute meant some
right or cause of action given by statute which did not
exist at common law, which did not depend upon any
contract relation, and where there was no original obli-
gation whatever created by the parties. Quoting from
Wood on Limitations, the Court said:24
"In section 39 the author also says: 'The test,
whether a statute creates a specialty debt or not,
might be said to be whether, independent of the stat-
ute the law implies an obligation to do that which
the statute requires to be done, and whether inde-
pendently of the statute a right of action exists for
the breach of the duty or obligation imposed by the
statute. If so, then the obligation is not in the nature
of a specialty, and is within the statute, so long as
the common law remedy is pursued; but if the stat-
ute creates the duty or obligation, then the obliga-
tion thereby imposed is a specialty, and is not with-
in the statute. If the statute imposes an obligation,
and gives a special remedy therefor, which otherwise
2 Relating to safe, deposit, trust, guaranty, loan and fidelity companies,
etc. See. 85L provided that "Each stockholder shall be liable to the
depositors and creditors of any such corporation for double the amount of
stock at the par value held by such stockholder in such corporation." This
Act really provided for triple liability. Later the Act of 1904, Chap. 101
reduced it from triple liability to double liability.
28 148 Md. 309, 129 A. 654 (1925).
2' 148 Md. 309, 314-315, 129 A. 654, 656 (1925) citing Wardle v. Hudson, 96
Mich. 435, 55 N. W. 992 (1893) ; Wood on Limitations (4th Ed.), Sec. 39;
and 26 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 3.
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could not be pursued, but at the same time a rem-
edy for the same matter exists at common law inde-
pendent of the statute, and the statute does not take
away the common law remedy, the bar of the statute
is effectual when the common law remedy for the
breach of the common law duty or liability is pur-
sued, but is not applicable when the special statutory
remedy is employed.' "25
The Court concluded that the proceeding before the
Commission was created by the statute, and had its foun-
dation therein, and had for its purpose the award as com-
pensation for death; that the suit on the award, which was
merely the approved way of enforcing it, was simply com-
pelling the complete performance of the obligation im-
posed by statute.
This case was relied on in the instant decision and seems
to couple with Ghingher v. Bachtel126 and Robinson v.
Hospelhorn27 as clear authority for the result.
Because of the recent changes28 prohibiting double lia-
bility as to stock in banks and trust companies in the fu-
ture, and provisions allowing for the retirement of the
already existing shares, the importance of such result may
be chiefly in its implications as to limitations with ref-
erence to related problems arising under statutes.
25 148 Md. 309, 315, 129 A. 654, 656 (1925).
" 169 Md. 678, 182 A. 558 (1936).
27169 Md. 117, 179 A. 515, 103 A. L. R. 740 (1935).
" Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 81. This act provides that this double liability
shall not apply to any stock originally issued subsequent to Nov. 13, 1936
and also provides that it shall cease on all the stock outstanding prior to
Nov. 13, 1936 when the bank or trust company complies with certain re-
quirements. The constitutional amendment deleting the double liability
requirement from Article 3, Section 39 of the Constitution was Md. Laws
1936 (Sp. Sess.), Ch. 151, approved by the voters at the November 7, 1936
election.
We can readily see that this subject of double liability on bank stock in
Maryland is not dead wood. This act does not compel the bank or trust
company to comply with these requirements as to outstanding stock and
the instant case extends the period of limitations to twelve years from the
date the court order for the enforcement of stockholders liability Is ob-
tained.
[VOL. IV
